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CIVIL

PROCEDUREITORT

LAW-BETTER

OFF

DEAD?:

MINORITY TOLLING PROVISION CANNOT SAVE DECEASED CHILD'S
CLAIM

It has been said that a child who loses a parent is an orphan.
A man who loses his wife is a widower. A woman who loses her
husband is a widow. There is no name for a parent who loses a
child, for there are no words to describe this pain. 1
INTRODUCTION

Terron Vance, born September 15, 1994, was taken to Henry
Ford Hospital in Detroit on July 31, 2002, as a result of pain caused
by sickle cell anemia. 2 He was admitted to the hospital for treat
ment and on the following day, just before his eighth birthday, he
died of an alleged morphine overdose. 3 Following his death, Dwun
neka Vance was appointed personal representative of Terron
Vance's estate. She filed a medical malpractice wrongful death ac
tion on September 13, 2004, two days before he would have turned
ten.
Dwunneka Vance believed these complaints were filed timely
under the savings provision, section 600.5851(7) of the Michigan
Compiled Laws, which states,
if, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a
person under section 5838a the person has not reached his or her
eighth birthday, a person shall not bring an action based on the
claim unless the action is commenced on or before the person's
tenth birthday .... 4

Because Terron Vance had not reached the age of eight before
he died, Dwunneka Vance made sure to file before Terron's tenth
birthday.5 However, the defendant-Henry Ford Hospital-moved
to dismiss as an untimely filing, arguing that the applicable statute
1. Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, N.Y. City, 9/11 Remembrance Ceremony (Sept.
11, 2004), available at http://transcripts.cnn.comffRANSCRIPTS/0409/11/se.01.html.
2. Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78, 79 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
3. [d. at 79.
4. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000) (footnote omitted).
5. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 79.
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of limitations was section 600.5851(1) of the Michigan Compiled
Laws, which provides,
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if
the person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action
under this act is under 18 years of age ... at the time the claim
accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have
1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise,
to ... bring the action although the period of limitations has run.
This section does not lessen the time provided for in section
5852.6

The defendant believed that Terron's death removed his dis
ability; thus, they argued that the appropriate limitation period for
Mrs. Vance to file as personal representative of Terron's estate had
expired under section 5852.7
The court, in deciding this issue, would determine whether the
Vance family could argue its claims and have its day in court, or
whether the hospital would be excused from defending itself against
a stale claim. Thus, a decision in favor of the defendant would fore
close the claim of any parent who was relying on section
600.5851(7) to bring an action as a result of her child's death.
Several other states have had occasion to consider statutes with
seemingly inconsistent infancy tolling provisions where medical
malpractice is involved in the death of a child. 8 The majority of
courts, including the court in Vance, have come to the same conclu
sion-a child ceases to have birthdays after he dies; therefore, the
savings provision no longer applies as it would if he had survived.
Instead, the applicable statute of limitations is that which applies to
the personal representative of the deceased's estate. 9
6. MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(1). Subsection 5852, in relevant part,
states that a personal representative may initiate suit, "any time within 2 years after
letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run."
7. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 80; see also MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5852 (West
2002).
8. See generally Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003); Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute,
IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657
(Ind. 2006); Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005); Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d
1240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M.
1985); Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Campos v. Ysleta Gen.
Hosp., Inc. (Campos J/), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 1994). While the parties are the
same in Campos I, the causes of action are not interrelated. See Campos v. Ysleta Gen.
Hosp., Inc. (Campos I), 836 S.W.2d 791,793 (Tex. App. 1992); see also infra note 108.
9. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 82-83. See generally cases cited supra note 8.
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From the point of view of these courts, there is no doubt that
the claims filed in accordance with infancy tolling provisions are
untimely if the child has died. Although it may seem like this
bright-line rule is proper under rules of statutory construction and
interpretation, it misses the ultimate intent of the legislature and
produces unjust results. There is no doubt that the Vances had a
viable medical malpractice claim, and that had Terron survived the
morphine overdose and filed a negligence suit on his own behalf on
the same date that his administrator did, his claim would have gone
forward. Yet, because Terron died as a result of the alleged negli
gence and his family relied on the inapplicable statute of limita
tions, the family was left with no judicial recourse.
Whether a personal representative of a deceased child's estate
should be able to rely on the same statute of limitations that would
have applied to the child is a matter of statutory interpretation.
Courts have uniformly decided in the negative. This Note suggests
that a look into legislative history provides a rationale in opposition
to the courts' views, and that allowing this type of claim to go for
ward is in line with both legislative intent and the general goals of
the adversarial system. Part I discusses the origin of statutes of lim
itation as well as the development of tort law, including wrongful
death actions. Part II describes the modern application of statutes
of limitation to tort law in the context of minority tolling provisions
and medical malpractice lawsuits. Part III discusses the relevant
case law dealing with the death of minors due to alleged medical
malpractice and the courts' rejection of reliance on minority tolling
provisions by the minor's estate. Finally, Part IV analyzes the flaws
in the rationale of those courts, followed by the presentation of a
fresh approach to interpreting the statutes that both supports legis
lative intent and promotes public policy.lO
10. It should be noted that although medical malpractice litigation is at issue in
the Note, it is a vast area of law which has been thoroughly examined in other materials.
See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLI
TICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPU
TATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACfICE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2004); Alec Shelby Bayer, Looking Beyond the Easy Fix and Delving into the Roots of
the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis,S Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'y 111 (2005); Scott
Forehand, Helping the Medicine Go Down: How a Spoonful of Mediation Can Alleviate
the Problems of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 907
(1999); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 943 (2004); Anthony J. Sebok, Dis
patches From the Tort Wars, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (reviewing TOM BAKER, THE
MEDICAL MALPRACfICE MYTH (2005)). While this Note will mention the medical mal
practice environment in which the relevant statutes and amendments were passed, it
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LIMITATION ON AcrION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TORT LAW

A statute of limitation is generally defined as "a statute as
signing a certain time after which rights cannot be enforced by legal
action or offenses cannot be punished."l1 Its purpose is to "require
diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and
predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be re
solved while evidence is reasonably available and fresh."12 Today's
common understanding of statutory limitations is the result of four
hundred years of variations and development. 13
A.

The Statute of James

The Statute of James was the first limitation-on-action stat
uteY It was enacted in England in 1623 out of a desire to prohibit
land from becoming unproductive. 15 Disputes required lengthy in
vestigation and litigation, during which time the land could not be
used. 16 Because with the passage of time it became impossible to
detect a defective title, statutes of limitation were adopted to "cure
this defect" and "repair the injuries committed by time."17 Several
limitation periods were established and subsequently abandoned.
Consequently, as Lord Coke understood, "many suits, troubles, and
inconveniences" arose, leading to the development of "one con
stant law," which "certain limitations might serve, both for the time
present, and for all times to come."18 Thus, England enacted The
Statute of James, "An Act for Limitation on Action, and for avoiddoes so only in an attempt to understand the legislative intent behind extending time
for minors to file medical malpractice suits.
11. MERRIAM·WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 1220 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MER.
RIAM-WEBSTER'S l.
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]'
13. See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1950).
14. See J.K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS AT LAW
AND SUITS IN EQUITY AND ADMIRALTY 6 (John Wilder May ed., 5th ed. 1869); Gail L.
Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of
Laches, 1992 BYU L. REV. 917,925-26.
15. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 6.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 9-10. Lord Coke served as the Chief Justice of the King's Bench during
the reign of James I. See generally 2 CUTHBERT WILLIAM JOHNSON, THE LIFE OF SIR
EDWARD COKE, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE OF ENGLAND IN THE REIGN OF JAMES I (Kes
singer Publishing 2007) (1845).
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ing of Suits at Law."19 The American colonies later adopted the
same statute. 20
B.

The Development of Tort Law in America

While statutes of limitation have been recognized since the
1600s, tort law did not develop as an independent branch of law
until late in the nineteenth century.21 During the spread of industri
alization at that time, many negligence cases arose between people
who had previously been strangers. Simultaneously, a wave of legal
scholars began to "question and discard old bases of legal classifica
tion. "22 This combination sparked the independence of torts as its
own legal category.
In the 1870s, Oliver Wendell Holmes, lr. emerged as one of the
first scholars to explore the subject.23 His greatest contribution was
defining negligence as a separate principle of tort law, which was
significant in two aspects.24 First, his definition expanded the con
cept of "neglect of a specific, predetermined duty to that of [a] vio
lation of a more general duty potentially owed to all the world. "25
Second, it "provide[d] Torts with a philosophical principle: no liabil
ity for tortious conduct absent fault."26 Additionally, Holmes ar
gued that fault was a requirement of liability, both in the strict
sense of intentional wrongs, as well as in the loose meaning of negli
gent, unintentional wrongs.27
19. An Act for Limitation on Action, and for Avoiding of Suits at Law, 21 lac., c.
16, § 1 (1623) (Eng.), reprinted in H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF
AcnONS AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 631 (1882); see also Heriot, supra note 14, at 926
(noting that the statute" provided specific lengths of time for numerous real property
and personal actions. It explicitly tolled these limitation periods for infancy, insanity,
imprisonment, coverture, and absence from the realm, but was silent concerning igno
rance. This statute is the model for statutes of limitation adopted by American
legislatures").
20. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 10.
21. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3
(1980).
22. ld. At this time Cambridge intellectuals, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Nicholas St. John Green, began to challenge the writ pleading system, a system en
trenched in esoteric pleading technicalities. Id. at 6-8. Dissatisfaction with the system
gave way to law-revision committees in Massachusetts and New York in order to make
the law more accessible to lay people. ld. at 8-9. With the collapse of the writ system,
contemporaneous legal thought brought forth the inception of torts as its own classifica
tion. ld. at 3.
23. ld. at 6-7.
24. ld. at 13.
25. ld.
26. ld. (footnote omitted).
27. ld.
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Holmes's principle that the law imposes a duty of care as well
as the ideas of fault and negligence are still chief components of the
modern day tort definition.28 While tort law has expanded since the
1800s to include specific wrongs such as wrongful death and medical
malpractice, the theory on which it is based has remained constant:
"[The] widespread attitude ... which presumes that most injured
persons are entitled to compensation . . . ."29 The public policy
goals of modern tort law are compensating victims and deterring
tortious conduct. 30
C.

Wrongful Death Causes of Action

At common law, a cause of action in tort did not survive the
victim's death. 31 No action could be brought on behalf of the dece
dent and no recovery could be obtained. Hence, "it was cheaper
for the.defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and ... the
most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim,
who frequently were destitute, without a remedy."32 Thus, all
wrongful death actions are a result of statutory creation.
An action for wrongful death is "[a] lawsuit brought on behalf
of a decedent's survivors for their damages resulting from a tortious
injury that caused the decedent's death."33 Its purpose is "to com
pensate the statutory beneficiaries for their own loss resulting from
the death."34 Awarding damages for wrongful death addresses the
needs of the injured party-the beneficiary-while at the same time
seeking to deter the defendant from further wrongdoing. In the
Vance case, the beneficiary may have had costly medical bills,
among other expenses, and undoubtedly would have wanted to pre
vent future negligent behavior of the hospital and staff.
Compensating the Vance family and preventing the further
negligence by the Henry Ford Hospital seems like a win-win, but
28. See BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1526. A tort is defined as "[a] civil wrong ...
for which a remedy may be obtained, usu[alJy] in the form of damages; a breach of a
duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another."
Id.
29. WHITE, supra note 21, at xv.
30. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism, 16 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 583, 585 (1993).
3l. . Melissa Lyn McLeod Hamrick, Comment, The MUlA: Bad Medicine and
Bad Law Is a Costly Combination for Texas Minors with Medical Death Claims, 3 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 123, 141 (1996).
32. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)).
33. BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1644.
34. In re McCoy, 373 F. Supp. 870, 875 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
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the Vance family was not so fortunate. In this case, it was cheaper
for the hospital to kill Terron Vance than it would have been to
injure him.35 This outcome turns on three factors: the application
of limitation on action to modern tort law; the atmosphere in which
recent statutory limits have been enacted; and the court's "plain
meaning interpretation" of the statutes at issue. 36
II.

THE MODERN ApPLICATION OF LIMITATIONS
ON ACTION TO TORT LAW

Many American statutes of limitation closely resemble the
original Statute of James37 and aim to remedy the same policy is
sues that plagued seventeenth-century England. 38 Nearly all ac
tions today in the United States are governed by statutes of
limitation, which "usually fix time limits ... on ... actions for inju
ries to the person ... and 'all other actions."'39 Each state has
varying versions of limitations on actions but they usually utilize
one of two possible constructions: (1) "all actions . . . shall be
brought within" or (2) "no action ... shall be brought more than" a
35. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 141. Had Terron survived he and his family would
have been able to use his tenth birthday as the applicable statute of limitations. Thus,
the hospital would not have been relieved of its liability.
36. See generally Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78 (Mich. Ct.
App.2006).
37. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 14 (John Wilder May ed., 6th ed. 1876) (stating
that "American acts of limitations, as they relate to personal actions ... , are either an
exact transcript of the statute of James, or a revision and modification of it ...."). The
Statute of James provided that:
For quieting of men's estates and avoiding of suits, be it enacted by the
King's most excellent majesty ... that all writs of formedon in descender ... in
remainder ... in reverter, at any time hereafter to be sued or brought, of, or
for any mannors, lands, tenements ... whereunto any person or persons now
hath or have any title, or cause to have or pursue any such writ, shall be sued
or taken within twenty years next after the end of this present session of Par
liament: And after the said twenty years expired, no person, or persons, or any
of their heirs, shall have or maintain any such writ ....
An Act for Limitation on Action, and for Avoiding of Suits at Law, 21 Jac., c. 16, § 1
(1623) (Eng.), reprinted in WOOD, supra note 19, at 631.
38. See Note, supra note 13, at 1185 ("There comes a time when [a person] ought
to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient
obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when 'evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.''' (footnote omitted) (quot
ing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944))).
39. [d. at 1179. Some crimes, such as those punishable by death, do not have a
statutory period of limitation. See 18 U.S.c. § 3281 (2006) ("An indictment for any
offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation.").
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specific number of years after the cause of action accrues. 40 Fur
ther, there is a large array of statutes of limitation that attempt to
deal with special situations, such as those actions affecting minors
and disabled persons. 41
Since the inception of the Statute of James, it has been recog
nized that there are some situations in which the statute of limita
tion that is applicable to most should not be applicable to all:
It is provided by the seventh section of the statute of James,

that if any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions
therein mentioned, shall be at the time of the cause of action
accrued, within the age of twenty-one years ... such person shall
be at liberty to bring the same actions within the times limited by
the statute, after his disability has terminated. 42

This type of infancy provision is prevalent in United States
statutes today.43 From California44 to Massachusetts,45 each state
has had an infancy exception extending the period of limitation.
However, in order to utilize the extension, the disability must exist
at the time that the action accrues-meaning that a disability that
affects the claimant after the cause of action has accrued will not
delay or interrupt the running of the statute. 46 This rationale re
flects a sentiment that the claimant who has had some opportunity
to bring a claim is less deserving of a suspension. 47 Additionally,
"the dangers of indefinite postponement have impelled the choice
40. Note, supra note 13, at 1179 (omissions in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
41. Id.
42. ANGELL, supra note 14, at 194.
43. For a comparative look at various state statutes, see Harry B. Littell, A Com
parison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945).
44. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (1975), invalidated by Arredondo v. Re
gents of Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Although no longer in
force because it was held to violate minors' rights to equal protection, this statute
stated: "Actions by a minor shall be commenced within three years from the date of the
alleged wrongful act except that actions by a minor under the full age of six years shall
be commenced within three years or prior to his eighth birthday whichever provides a
longer period." Id. For a more in depth discussion of this topic, see generally Natalie
Mantell, Note, Limitations on a Minor's Right to Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Consti
tutional Analysis, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 97 (2005).
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006) ("[A]ny claim by a minor against
a health care provider ... shall be commenced within three years from the date the
cause of action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years shall have
until his ninth birthday in which the action may be commenced ....").
46. Note, supra note 13, at 1229.
47. Id. at 1230.
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of the termination of existing disabilities as a convenient, if arbi
trary, time to commence the running of the statutory period."48

A.

General Rationale for the Minor's Exception Provisions

Determining the purpose of both the general limitation and the
exception are necessary to establish why denying recovery to the
Vance family is both immoral and judicially unsound. Statutes of
limitation, once used to settle land disputes, have evolved to extend
to nearly all facets of the law. 49 They "prescribe[] time limits on
the assertion of rights, ... depriv[ing] one party of the opportunity,
after a time, of invoking the public power in support of an other
wise valid claim."50 Legislatures have used these limitations prima
rily to protect defendants,51 reasoning that there should be a time
when a potential defendant's "slate has been wiped clean of ancient
obligations."52 However, in personal actions, the main considera
tion behind limiting actions is that after a certain length of time,
there is a lack of evidence and available witnesses. 53 Therefore, by
setting a limitation, the courts have been relieved of adjudicating
"inconsequential or tenuous claims. "54
Because statutes of limitation are generally enacted to protect
the rights of defendants, legislatures have adopted exclusionary
rules to also protect minor plaintiffs. Exceptions are needed to pro
tect minors until they can decide themselves whether to pursue a
claim.55 For example, this provision relates to the situation where
"a minor has no parent or guardian to bring suit on its behalf, or
whose parent or guardian may, for any number of perfectly valid
reasons, be unwilling or unable to do SO."56 The provisions also
allow for a situation in which, because of a child's age, he is incom
petent to testify on his own behalf, or the full scope of his injuries
has not materialized during the regularly applicable time period. 57
48. Id.
49. See Littell, supra note 43.
50. Note, supra note 13, at 1185.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. This Note also points out that unsettled claims can have an adverse effect
on commercial business.
54. !d.
55. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214 (citing Robinson v. Pa. Hosp., 737 A.2d
291, 294 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999».
56. Robinson, 737 A.2d at 294.
57. See Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (citing
Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970».
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This purpose relates directly to the situation in Vance, in which Ter
ron was unable to communicate his injuries to his parents and the
full scope of the injuries included his death, which, clearly rendered
him unable to testify.58
B.

The Medical Malpractice Facet

Because poor medical treatment can be fatal, wrongful death
suits often arise from medical malpractice. Beginning for the first
time in the 1970s, a wave of legislative action swept the nation. 59
Inspired by a perceived crisis in medical malpractice litigation, the
solution, legislatures agreed, was medical malpractice tort reform. 60
In the 1980s, medical malpractice insurance premiums skyrock
eted. 61 The legislative solution this time was to limit the avenues
for plaintiffs to get into court and, through tort reform, limit what
could be done once in the courtroom. 62 Most recently in 2002, in
surance premiums rose again, and, not surprisingly, the effect has
been further reform. 63 Controversy exists over whether medical
malpractice liability insurance premiums are an accurate reflection
of the number of malpractice suits being filed. 64 However, the in
surance companies-for the most part-are not raising premiums
and supporting tort reform in an effort to make more money at the
public's expense. 65 Rather, they are concerned that there is a mal
practice litigation epidemic. 66 This perceived epidemic has sparked
the type of reform that limits the amount of time a plaintiff has to
bring a malpractice suit and encourages the judiciary to narrowly
interpret statutes that would extend this limitation period. 67
58. Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d. 78 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
59. BAKER, supra note 10, at 1 (2005).
60. Id. at 2.
61. ld.
62. ld.
63. ld.
64. ld. at 3.
65. ld. at 6-8.
66. ld. at 8.
67. See, e.g., Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003). In Randolph, the court stated:
The Medical Malpractice Act was enacted in response to increasing insurance
premiums.... The purpose of the act was to provide health care providers
with some protection from malpractice claims in order to preserve the availa
bility of medical services .... Interpreting the statute of limitations exception
for minors to include deceased minors would expand liability for health care
providers, and would not be consistent with the goals of the Medical Malprac
tice Act.
Id. at 236.
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Regardless of the "true concern" of the insurance companies,
there has been evidence available since the rnid-1970s that suggests
almost the opposite. The California Hospital and Medical Associa
tions sponsored a study during that period that was expected to
support the need for tort reform. 68 Instead, the report revealed
that medical malpractice affected tens of thousands of victims every
year, more than automobile and workplace accidents, and that the
victims did not sue. 69 What then has made the insurance premiums
spike during certain periods in the last thirty years? Evidence sug
gests that it is due to "financial trends and competitive behavior in
the insurance industry," not litigious Americans. 7o
Still, media focus remains on mass torts, products liability, and
medical malpractice; and the symbiotic relationship between doc
tors, health insurers, and businesses keeps medical malpractice and
tort at the forefront of political debates.7 1 For example, in January
of 2005, President Bush delivered a speech in Collinsville, Illinois,
on the issue of medical liability reform. 72 He stood beneath a large
banner printed with the words "Affordable Healthcare."73 Both
the banner and his address on the "broken medical liability system"
reflected the president's view that health care costs cannot be re
duced without tort reform.7 4 The president continued to outline his
ideas designed to control health care costs,75 and finally, arrived at
his main point:
What's happening all across this country is that lawyers are filing
baseless suits against hospitals and doctors .... They know the
medical liability system is tilted in their favor. Jury awards in
medical liability cases have skyrocketed in recent years. That
means every claim filed by a personal-injury lawyer brings the
chance of a huge payoff .... And because the system is so unpre
dictable, there is a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury
award.7 6
68.
69.

BAKER,

supra note 10, at 2.

[d.

70. [d. at 3. For example, during the 1980s, the costs of insurance investment and
loss predictions were built into the price of malpractice premiums. [d. at 51. Once
optimistic in their predictions, insurers who had offered low premiums had switched to
more pessimistic predictions for the late 1980s and therefore increased their premiums.
[d. at 51-52.
71. [d. at 8-12.
72. [d. at 12.
73. [d.
74. [d. at 13.
75. [d.
76. ld.
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Not surprisingly, the association between contempt towards
the frivolous lawsuit, the slimy lawyer, and the baseless claim and
increased insurance premiums and unaffordable health care has led
to the tort reform that has changed the statutory landscape of our
current legal system. Yet, what about the Vance family? Its claim
was neither baseless nor frivolous; its lawsuit was not filed in hopes
of an unpredictable massive jury award; and the medical liability
system was certainly not tilted in its favor. How is it that this family
slipped through the cracks of the legal system?

III.

CASE LAW SUPPORTS DEFENDANTS

Parents attempting to rely on the statute of limitations that
would have been available to their child, if living, have a strong
moral argument but can rely on little precedent. Case law over
whelmingly supports defendants on the issue of whether a minority
tolling provision extends to administrators of a deceased minor's
estate. 77 While courts have been clear on the outcome-parents
cannot rely on the provision that tolls the statute of limitations for
minors-they have arrived at this conclusion via two avenues of
thought. The first line of reasoning is based on the child's birthday,
and the second finds support in the courts' interpretation of legisla
tive intent.

A.

The "Birthday Rationale"

Many of the statutes extending the time for minors to file a
claim measure that extension in terms of the child's birthday, for
example, "on or before the person's tenth birthday."78 The "birth
day rationale" refers to the reasoning behind which some courts
77. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(exception in statute of limitations only applies to a living child); Bailey v. Martz, 488
N.E.2d 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (minor's death removed age disability), superseded by
statute, IND. CODE § 34-23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d
657 (Ind. 2006); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985) (minor
ity exception applies only to living minors); Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2002) (minority tOlling statute not available to deceased minor plaintiff); Campos v.
Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos 1/), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App. 1994) (minority tolling
provision only applicable in wrongful death cases); cf Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E. 2d 1107
(Mass. 2005) (statute of repose was not tolled despite defendants' concealment of facts
necessary for parents to bring wrongful death action); Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d 1240
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (statute of limitations period commenced when father repre
sented minor child in earlier action).
78. MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000).
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have placed the weight of their decisions. 79 Courts applying the
birthday rationale have considered the plain meaning of the statute
at issue and decided that, by definition, a dead person cannot have
a "birthday." Therefore, courts find these tolling provisions to be
inapplicable. 80
1.

Vance v. Henry Ford Health Systems

The Michigan Court of Appeals in Vance v. Henry Ford Health
Systems rejected both parties' arguments and interpretations of the
relevant statutes. 81 The relevant Michigan law provided that a
plaintiff, absent exclusion, is required to file his claim within two
years of its accrual. 82 Additionally, Michigan law provides:
If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or
within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action
which survives by law may be commenced by the personal repre
sentative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after
letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations
has run. But an action shall not be brought under this provision
unless the personal representative commences it within 3 years
after the period of limitations has run. 83

The Vance family believed that it was entitled to an exclusion
from the standard malpractice claim limitation and filed its case
under the time limits prescribed by section 600.5851(7) of the Mich
igan Compiled Laws,84 which states:
[I]f, at the time a claim alleging medical malpractice accrues to a
person under section 5838a the person has not reached his or her
eighth birthday, a person shall not bring an action based on the
claim unless the action is commenced on or before the person's
tenth birthday or within the period of limitations set forth in sec
tion 5838a, whichever is later. 85
79. See, e.g., Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d 78, 82-83 (Mich. Ct.
App.2006).
80. Id.
81. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 81-83.
82. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(5) ("Except as otherwise provided in
this chapter, the period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.").
83. /d. § 600.5852.
84. Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 82.
85. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (footnote omitted). Section
600.5838a(2) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, ... a claim based on
medical malpractice may be commenced ... within the applicable period pre
scribed in section 5805 or sections 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the
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Intuitively, the plaintiffs believed their suit was timely, considering
the facts that their son died before the age of eight, and that their
suit was filed before his tenth birthday.86
The defendants argued that the applicable statute was section
600.5851(1) of Michigan Compiled Laws,87 which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsections (7) and (8), if the
person first entitled to make an entry or bring an action under
this act is under 18 years of age or insane at the time the claim
accrues, the person or those claiming under the person shall have
1 year after the disability is removed through death or otherwise,
to make the entry or bring the action although the period of limi
tations has run. 88

According to this section, the defendants reasoned, although
Terron Vance was under the age of eighteen when the action ac
crued, his death removed the disability, therefore rendering section
600.5851(7) inapplicable. Thus, there was a one year statute of limi
tations, subject to the appointment of an administrator under sec
tion 600.5852 of Michigan Compiled Laws. 89 Under the
defendants' rationale, the Vances had until August 20, 2004, which
was two years from the date the personal representative was ap
pointed, to file suit. 90 There was no dispute that the plaintiffs filed
on September 13, 2004, two days before the tenth anniversary of
Terron's birth, and thus the defendants argued that the claim was
time barred.91
The court was quick to dispose of the defendants' argument
that section 600.5851 was controlling, stating that subsection (1)
"unambiguously excludes medical malpractice actions from its
scope by including language specifically referencing malpractice ac
tions and the phrase, '[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsections
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, which
ever is later. However, except as otherwise provided in section 5851(7) or (8),
the claim shall not be commenced later than 6 years after the date of the act or
omission that is the basis for the claim .... A medical malpractice action that
is not commenced within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
86. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 81-82.
87. Id. at 81.
88. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(1).
89. See Vance, 726 N.W.2d at 79-80.
90. Id. at 79.
91. See id. at 81.

2009]

BETTER OFF DEAD?

505

(7) and (8)."'92 The court thus concluded that the action was gov
erned by either section 5851(7)-the plaintiff's suggestion-or sec
tion 5852-its own proposal-of the Michigan Compiled Laws. 93
Unfortunately for the Vances, the court did not find that sec
tion 600.5851(7) was the appropriate limitation to be applied. How
ever, more important than the outcome was the court's reasoning.
The court followed a process of elimination, rather than one of in
terpretation, in deciding the correct statute of limitation.
Looking at the infancy tOlling provision suggested by the
Vances, the court stated that, "[w]hen faced with questions of statu
tory interpretation, the courts must discern and give effect to the
Legislature's intent as expressed by the words in the statute."94
With this in mind, the court reviewed what it understood to be the
relevant clauses in the statute: "person has not reached his or her
eighth birthday," and, "unless the action is commenced on or before
the person's tenth birthday."95 The questions presented, then, were:
(1) what does the word "birthday" mean; and (2) does "a deceased
minor continue[] to age after death?"96
Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the canons of
statutory construction state that the court is to presume "that the
Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed. "97 Without a
definition of "birthday" given in the statute, the Michigan Court of
Appeals turned to the plain meaning, finding three potential defini
tions of "birthday." It could be the day marking the anniversary of
a person's birth, the actual day of the person's birth, or a day that
commemorated the beginning of a new thing.98 The court, how
ever, was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that "birthday"
was meant to cut off rights based on the "anniversary" of the de
ceased minor's birth.99 Instead, the court based its rationale on the
word "reach."lOO Stating that the court "must give effect to every
word, phrase, and clause in [the] statute and avoid an interpretation
that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nuga
92. [d. at 82 (second alteration in original) (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5851(1)).
93. [d.
94. [d.
95. [d. (emphases added) (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7)).
96. [d.

97. [d.
98. /d.
99. [d.
100. [d.
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tory,"101 the court determined that a person who dies no longer has
"the power, capacity, and ability to act," and thus cannot "reach"
his tenth birthday.102
In concluding that the section 600.5851(7) minority tolling pro
vision did not apply, the Michigan Court of Appeals deduced that
the personal administrator statute of limitation provision, section
600.5852, was the controlling statute, thus barring an otherwise
meritorious claim because it had been filed twenty-four days too
late.1 03

2.

Campos v. Ysleta General Hospital

Texas has a similar minority tolling provision to Michigan,
which was interpreted to prevent the Campos family from bringing
a suit on behalf of their son. 104 Jose Angel Campos, Jr., was five
years old when he was taken to Y sleta General Hospital by his
mother and uncle.1°5 After being refused treatment for failure to
demonstrate their ability to pay, they left for another medical treat
ment center where they were told to fill out forms and remain in
the waiting room until an exam room became available.l°6 Appar
ently believing that this too was a denial of treatment, Ms. Campos
and her brother-in-law went to a third treatment facility where Jose
was seen by physician David Allen Smith for approximately thirty
minutes before he was pronounced dead from respiratory arrest. 107
The Camposes brought a survival action against the hospital
for their son's wrongful death. lOS The court held that the suit was
101. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vega
v. Lakeland Hosps. at Niles & St. Joseph, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 389 (2005)).
102. See id. at 81, 83.
103. Id. at 83. Under § 5852 the Vances would have had to file by August 20,
2004. However they relied on 5851(7) and filed on September 13, 2004. Id. at 79. The
tenth anniversary of Terron's birth was September 15, 2004. Id.
104. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (re
pealed 2003); Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos II), 879 S.W.2d 67, 73 (Tex.
App. 1994).
105. Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos I), 836 S:W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.
App.1992).
.
106. See id. at 793; see also Campos lJ, 879 S.W.2d at 69.
107. Campos I, 836 S.W.2d at 791; see also Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 69.
108. The Campos family brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the Ysleta
General Hospital, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's directed verdict
for the defendant, stating that the "plaintiffs had presented no evidence that any act or
omission of any defendant was a cause in fact of Jose Campos's death." Campos lJ, 879
S.W.2d at 69. Subsequently, on August 19, 1991, almost three years after the death of
their five year-old son, the Camposes filed another suit alleging a survival cause of
action. See id.
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frivolous in part because it was brought after the statute of limita
tions had run. 109 The Camposes appealed, maintaining that the in
fancy tolling provision in the applicable statute of limitations
allowed them to file suit up until Jose's fourteenth birthday.110
They argued that the clause extending the period of limitation for
minors under the age of twelve applied to their situation since their
son was only five when he died. 111
The court rejected the position that the statute of limitations
section lO.Ol-was applicable, holding that "[u]nder this argument
... the statute of limitations would never run in a situation where a
child dies and therefore never reaches the age of fourteen. "112 The
court went on to state, without explanation, that "the tolling proviSurvival causes of action are different from wrongful death actions in that the "law·
suit [is] brought on behalf of a decedent's estate for injuries or damages incurred by the
decedent immediately before dying." BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1486. In contrast to a
wrongful death action, which is an action that compensates the beneficiaries of the de
cedent, a survival claim compensates the decedent's estate for the suffering of the dece
dent. In this action, the Camposes were specifically alleging harm to their son, which
occurred in the hours before his death. See Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 73. The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendants having argued
that the claim was barred both by res judicata and by the applicable two-year statute of
limitations. See id. at 69. In Texas, res judicata will bar a suit if the subsequent suit
"arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit which through the exercise of
diligence, could have been litigated in the prior suit." Id. at 73. Sanctions were im
posed against the Camposes for filing a groundless suit, brought in bad faith for the
purpose of harassment. !d. at 70, 72-73.
109. The court was correct in determining that, had the plaintiffs put together a
more complete argument in the original suit, both the wrongful death and survival suits
could have been tried in one action; thus, the second suit was appropriately barred res
judicata. Id. at 73. While the Camposes-or their attorney-arguably made poor
choices regarding the filing of claims, what is more interesting is their argument on
appeal regarding the imposition of sanctions. The plaintiffs argued that sanctions
should not be imposed because their suit was not groundless, in bad faith, or filed for
the purpose of harassment. Id.
110. See id. At the time that Campos II was decided, the applicable statute of
limitations was article 4590i, section 10.01 of Vernon's Texas Revised Civil Statutes
Annotated:
Notwithstanding any other law, no health care liability claim may be com
menced unless the action is filed within two years from the occurrence of the
breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the
subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made com
pleted; provided that, minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their
14th birthday in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim. Except as
herein provided, this subchapter applies to all persons regardless of minority
or other legal disability.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (repealed 2003)
(emphasis added).
111. Campos II, 879 S.W.2d at 73.
112. Id.
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sions for children under twelve [were] clearly not meant to apply in
wrongful death or survival cases. "113 Whether the Campos II suit
would have warranted a damage award for the plaintiffs is some
what of a moot point. More importantly, this case, like Vance, elim
inates an avenue of recovery for parents seeking justice for their
deceased children.

3.

Holt v. Lenko and Awve v. Physicians Insurance Co. of
Wisconsin, Inc.

In Holt v. Lenko, the plaintiff, like the Campos family, brought
a claim for the death of her son.114 Nicole Holt, pregnant and in
labor, was admitted to Butler Memorial Hospital in Pennsylvania
on December 4, 1994.115 She gave birth to her son Andrew on De
cember 5, 1994, and he died later that same day.116 Holt filed her
complaint on October 29, 1999, alleging that the negligence of the
defendant hospital and doctors in their treatment of both mother
and child caused Andrew's death.!17
Holt sought to recover damages under two different Penn
sylvania statutes, one governing wrongful death actions and the
other survival actions.1 18 On appeal, although the plaintiff con
ceded the wrongful death claim to be untimely, she maintained her
argument that the survival action was timely filed.1 19 In Penn
sylvania, the survival statute provides that in the case where a de
ceased person had a cause of action at the time of death, the action
survives the death of the plaintiff and the administrator or executor
of the estate may then bring suit to recover. 120 Furthermore, the
survival statute was interpreted to provide that "the statute of limi
tations begins to run on the date of the injury, as though the dece
dent were bringing his or her own lawsuit."121
Holt's argument was strengthened by the Pennsylvania minor
ity tolling provision, which provides that "[i]f an individual entitled
to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the time the
113. Id.
114. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
115. Id. at 1213.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b}(I}(i} (West 2007) (minority tolling
provision); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (West 2004) (survival statute).
119. Holt, 791 A.2d at 1213-14. The trial judge, on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, originally dismissed both claims as untimely. Id. at 1213.
120. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302.
121. Holt, 791 A.2d at 1215.
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cause of action accrues," then "[s]uch person shall have the same
time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed
to others by the provisions of this subchapter."122 The statute fur
ther defines "minor" as "any individual who has not yet attained 18
years of age."123
Under both the survival statute and the tolling provision for
minors, Holt argued on appeal that she had from the time of the
original negligence-the day Andrew died-until he would have
reached the age of majority eighteen years later.u4 Based on the
aim of the Pennsylvania survival statute and the minority tolling
provision, Holt reasoned that her son would have had a right to file
a negligence claim for the alleged malpractice of his doctors sur
rounding his birth until age eighteen, and that his right passed to
her upon his death as the administrator of his estate. 125
The court did not agree with Holt's argument, and she was left
with no recourse against the doctors or hospital. Relying on the
plain meaning of the statute, the court held that "[t]here is nothing
in the statutory language that would indicate that the legislature
intended that the minority tolling statute would be available to a
deceased minor plaintiff. "126 Without discussing how it reached this
conclusion, the court claimed that it found support for its holding in
Wisconsin case law.u7
In Awve v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., parents
faced similar circumstances as Holt when their son died at the very
young age of thirty-two weeks, all of which he had spent in the hos
pital. 128 His parents waited just over four years before filing a med
ical malpractice claim that included both wrongful death and
survival actions.1 29
In Wisconsin, the tolling provision of the statute of limitations
for minors' personal injury actions resulting from medical care re
quires the action to be filed within time limitations of section
122. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1}(i}.
123. [d. § 5533(b)(1}(ii).
124. See Holt, 791 A.2d at 1215 (noting that as a survival action, the action sur
vives the death of the victim and "may be brought by the administrator of the dece
dent's estate to recover the loss to the estate resulting from the tort").
125. [d. at 1213-14.
126. [d. at 1214.
127. [d.
128. Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 512 N.W.2d 216, 216 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994); see also Holt, 791 A.2d at 1212 (similar factual situation).
129. See Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 217-18.
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893.55,130 or "by the time that person reaches the age of 10 years,

whichever is later."131 The Awve family relied on both the latter
provision and section 895.01, which provides "that a decedent's per
sonal injury action survives the decedent's death."132 Using both of
these statutes, the Awves apparently believed that their action had
nearly ten years to be filed; therefore, filing after only four years
was, as they understood it, both timely and diligent. 133
During the time between the alleged malpractice and the time
of filing, the family took numerous steps to investigate the death of
their son in anticipation of filing a lawsuit. 134 In early 1991, the
parents retained a lawyer and began reviewing medical records with
two different doctors, one of whom stated that, "had [the mother]
been diagnosed by [her doctor] in a timely fashion as being in labor
and had attempts been made by [her] to arrest the labor, those at
tempts in all probability would have been successful."135
Thus, despite evidence that the Awves's case was one of legiti
mate medical malpractice, or at least a question for a jury, the court
dismissed the case.136 The court stated that because of the lack of
cross reference between the survival statute and the minority tolling
provision, it needed only to look to section 893.56 (the minority
tolling provision) to determine the outcome of the Awves's ap
peal.1 37 The court held that the statute was "unambiguous."138
Looking to the clause, "by the time that person reaches the age of
10 years," the court held that "reaches" was the operative word,
and that in order to "reach" an age, a minor must be living.139 The
130. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 2006). Section 893.55 states in relevant part:
[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from any treatment or oper
ation performed by ... a person who is a health care provider, regardless of
the theory on which the action is based, shall be commenced within the later
of:
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered ... except that an
action may not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from
the date of the act or omission.
Id. § 893.55(lm).
131. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.56; see also Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 218.
132. Awve, 512 N.W.2d at 218 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.01).
133. See id. at 217-18.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 218 (third alteration in original).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.56
(West 2006».
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court then opined that had the legislature intended for deceased
minors to be included within the tolling provision, the legislature
would have added something to the effect of, "'by the time the mi
nor reaches or would have reached' the age of 10 years."140
Like Holt, the Awves were left without remedy against the
doctors or the hospital. The Pennsylvania court in Holt used the
Wisconsin court's decision in Awve as persuasive authority.1 41
However, neither court entertained alternate interpretations, sim
ply stating that the parents' interpretations were incorrect and the
statutes were unambiguous. Furthermore, the Court in Holt failed
even to establish how its own legislature's intent was furthered by
its interpretation, deferring instead to Wisconsin case law. The
Pennsylvania statute is substantially different from the Wisconsin
statute: the word "reach" never appears within the language of the
statute. 142 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania court incorrectly relied
on Wisconsin case law and failed to effectively interpret its own
statute.
4.

Bailey v. Martz

Thirteen-year-old Mark Bailey was riding his dirt bike when he
was tragically struck by a train rendering him a quadriplegic.143
Tragedy only continued for Mark during his stay at the hospital.
On July 11, 1979, the heart monitor that Mark was wearing mal
functioned and severely burned him.144 After his release on May
28, 1980, Mark experienced breathing problems and was taken back
to the hospital. 145 He was released only to stop breathing again two
days later.1 46 As a result of this, Mark entered into a coma and died
on June 14, 1980. 147
Because the train failed to blow its whistle, Mark's father re
tained an attorney to represent him and his son in all possible
claims resulting from the accident and the subsequent medical mal
140. ld.
141. See Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
142. Compare 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i) (West 2007), with WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 893.56.
143. Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by
statute, IND. CODE § 34·23-2-1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d
657, 661 (Ind. 2006).
144. ld.
145. ld.
146. ld.
147. ld.

512

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVJEW

[Vol. 31:491

practice. 148 However, this attorney failed to take any action, includ
ing filing a claim against the train company, causing Mr. Bailey to
discharge him and retain new counsel. 149 Mr. Bailey hired new
counsel on. November 11, 1981. 150 However, after learning that
they were in possession of the claim when the applicable statute
had run, the new counsel withdrew from the case for fear of being
sued for malpractice for having failed to file the claim,151 Mr. Bai
ley did not retain new counsel until June 14, 1982. 152
In this case, the defendants were the second set of lawyers that
Mr. Bailey had hired to represent him.153 They were granted sum
mary judgment, and on appeal argued that Mark's claim was not
barred by the statute of limitations while they represented him.154
The defendants relied on Indiana Code section 34-1-2-5, stating that
"one who is under legal disability when the cause of action accrues
may bring his action within two years after the disability is re
moved."155 The attorneys argued that sixteen-year-old Mark fell
into this category because a legal disability, for the purposes of the
Indiana statute, includes those minors under the age of eighteen. 156
Under this rationale the claim did not expire while in their hands.
While different from the previous cases where plaintiff parents
relied on the tolling provisions even after their child's death, the
defendants here tried to use the same rationale to escape legal mal
practice liability. However, the Indiana court, like the others,
found the language of the statute instructive and threw out the at
torneys' interpretation. 157
The Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the legal disabil
ity-minority-was removed by death and that the defendants' in
terpretation of the statute of limitations extending two years
beyond the date of his eighteenth birthday was incorrect. 15s The
court specifically noted the gross unfairness of its interpretation by
stating: "[H]ad Mark lived, running of the applicable statute of limi
148. Jd.
149. ld.
150. Jd.
151. Jd. at 718-19.
152. Jd. at 719.
153. See id. at 716, 718-19.
154. Jd. at 722.
155. See id. (footnote omitted) (citing
pealed 1998)).
156. Jd.
157. /d.
158. /d.

IND. CODE ANN.
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tations would have been tolled until July 28, 1982, his 18th birthday.
Because Mark did not live, however, his right to recover damages
... passed on his death ...."159 This Indiana court, like the others,
dismissed the possibility of an alternative interpretation and left
parents of children like Mark without the hope of litigating their
claims beyond the personal representative time limitations.
B.

Legislative Intent Rationale

In addition to looking to the plain meaning of the minority toll
ing statutes, several courts have delved deeper, finding that even if
the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, an interpretation
that protects hospitals and doctors is the accurate reading of the
tolling provision. 160 This line of reasoning not only unfairly pro
tects defendants, but is based on what could be a false idea that the
health care and insurance industries need protection from litigious
Americans.
1.

Randolph v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc.

On October 7, 1991, Kwabene Randolph was born.1 61 He suf
fered from an anoxic brain injury and had severe breathing difficul
ties and seizures until his death on May 7, 1992.1 62 On September
26, 1997, his mother, Charlotte Randolph, filed a medical malprac
tice claim under Indiana law claiming that the wrongful death of
her son was due to the failure of the medical providers to diagnose
his "severe fetal distress, ... thereby resulting in Kwabene's severe
asphyxia, seizures, and ultimately, his premature death."163
The trial court dismissed the mother's claims, holding that al
though they were properly brought on behalf of her son, they were
time barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, which, al
though since declared unconstitutional, stated:
A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought
against a health care provider ... unless the claim is filed within
two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neg
159.

[d.

160. See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003); Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 429 (N.M. 1985); Brown v.
Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1998).
161. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 233.
162. [d.
163. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Appellants' Brief at 4, Ran
dolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 45A03-021O
CV-371), available at 2003 WL 25266492).
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lect, except that a minor less than six (6) years of age has until
the minor's eighth birthday to file. l64

.;

Randolph relied on the last clause of the Act, believing that
her claim was timely because her child died before the age of six,
and, as such, would have been able to file his own claim until he
turned eight. 165 However the court found that the first clause of the
Act's limitation on action applied to the Randolph's claim, and be
cause it was not filed within two years of her son's death, it was
dismissed. 166
Without discussing Indiana's own statute, the court found the
decision of the Superior Court in Pennsylvania in Holt and the
holding of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Awve persuasive and
applicable to its own case. 167 The court noted that even if the lan
guage of the statute was ambiguous, the interpretation favoring a
narrower reading of the statute "properly gives effect to the intent
of the legislature."168
The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to include de
ceased children would defeat the enactment of the Medical Mal
practice Act because its purpose was "to provide health care
providers with some protection from malpractice claims in order to
preserve the availability of medical services for the public health
and well-being."169 Further, the legislation was in response to in
creasing .insurance premiums at a time when "some doctors were
already unable to afford malpractice insurance."17o Including de
ceased minors in the exception from the two-year limitation would
expand liability for providers. l7l The fact that the court refused to
allow the claim to go forward for fear that insurance premiums
would be affected seems only to support the notion that parents
like the Randolphs have valid claims for which they should receive
compensation.

164. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-7-1(b) (West 1999), invalidated by Booth v. Wiley,
839 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind. 2005).
165. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 234.
166. Id.
167. /d. at 235.
168. Id. at 236.
169. Id. (citing Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hosp., Inc., 410 N.E.2d 1319,
1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
170. Id. (citing Lee, 410 N.E.2d at 1323).
171. Id.
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Brown v. Shwarts and Regents of University of New
Mexico v. Armijo

Christina Brown entered the emergency room at Navarro Me
morial Hospital in Texas during her third trimester, complaining of
nausea, headaches, cough, and wetness in her pants. l72 She was
given a hepatitis shot, prescribed a sonogram, and told "to return to
the hospital if her symptoms worsened."173 Days later, Christina
returned to the hospital and was seen by another doctor, who told
her that she had been leaking amniotic fluid for several days.17 4
She subsequently gave birth to a premature baby boy, who died two
days later. 175
The Browns filed a medical malpractice claim against the hos
pital and the first doctor who saw Christina. 176 The defendants
countered that the claim was time-barred under the Medical Liabil
ity and Insurance Improvement Act, which states:
[N]o health care liability claim may be commenced unless the ac
tion is filed within two years from the occurrence of the ... medi
cal ... treatment that is the subject of the claim ... provided that,
minors under the age of 12 years shall have until their 14th birth
day in which to file, or have filed on their behalf, the claim.l77

The Browns believed their claims were filed well before the
expiration of the statute of limitations because the claim was based
on the death of their child, who died under the age of twelve. Once
again, this court, like so many others, was asked to answer the ques
tion, "if the child dies after being born, when does [the statute of]
limitations [begin to] run?"178
The Texas Supreme Court held, as others have, that the wrong
ful death claim is barred by the statute of limitations if it is not filed
within two years and rejected the idea that the parents could invoke
the minority tolling provision. 179 Holding that "[l]imitations on a
wrongful death action based on negligent health care is not tolled
or extended because the decedent was a minor" and that, "'the toll
ing provision ... that applies to a minor does not apply to an adult's
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
(repealed
178.
179.

Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1998).
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld. (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon 1977)
2003».
[d.
ld. at 333-34.
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wrongful death claims,''' the court acknowledged that this interpre
tation could result in harsh outcomes. 180 However, the court rea
soned that the legislature was free to place any limitations on the
period in which a wrongful death suit may be brought, reminding
the plaintiffs that the cause of action was a creature of statute, and
the right to file a wrongful death suit did not exist at common
law. 181 Accordingly, the court held that the Browns filed their
claim one day too late.1 82
Similar to Brown, in Regents of University of New Mexico v.
Armijo, the Armijo family also lost its infant son. 183 However, be
cause the hospital was a government entity, the Armijos filed their
claim under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act of 1978, which
provides:
Actions against a governmental entity ... for torts shall be
forever barred, unless such action is commenced within two years
after the date of the occurrence resulting in loss, injury, or death,
except that a minor under the full age of seven years shall have
until his ninth birthday in which to file. 184

The Court of Appeals held that the Armijos could invoke the
minority tolling provision on behalf of their deceased son because
the Tort Claims Act included wrongful death suits.18s
The Supreme Court of New Mexico overturned the Court of
Appeals, holding "that the Legislature intended to allow only living
minors under the age of seven years additional time in which to
prosecute actions for loss or injury."186 The court held that inter
preting the statute to apply only to living minors was the most logi
cal conclusion and reasoned that the Court of Appeals'
interpretation would broaden the statute by "convert[ing] the two
year limitations period ... into a possible nine-year limitations pe
riod. "187 Such broadening, the court stated, would "undermine the
Legislature's intent to ... protect to some extent the State's finan
cial resources from stale claims."188
180. Id. (quoting Baptist Mem'! Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120, 121
(Tex. 1996».
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985).
184. Id. at 429 (quoting N.M. STAT. § 41-4-15(A) (1977)).
185. Armijo v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 704 P.2d 437, 441-42 (N.M. App. 1984),
rev'd in part, 704 P.2d 428 (N.M. 1985).
186. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 704 P.2d at 429.
187. See id. at 430.
188. See id.
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Legislative intent has been a rationale in these courts' deci
sions to disallow otherwise valid claims as untimely. Whether the
statute was passed because of a perceived medical malpractice in
surance crisis or as a way to limit a state's liability, these courts have
systematically denied parents a way to enforce justice against the
medical community. These decisions "force parents to file malprac
tice actions within the two-year statutory period without full knowl
edge of the possible negligence visited on their children. Parents
should not be required to file premature lawsuits on behalf of their
children."189
C.

Statutes of Repose Add Additional Problems for Minors

Several states, including Massachusetts, add an additional ca
veat known as a statute of repose to their statute of limitations on
medical malpractice tort actions.190 A statute of repose sets a defin
itive time limit after which no suit can be brought to court, even if
the plaintiff does not learn of the injury until after the time limit has
lapsed. 191 The relevant statute of repose in Massachusetts states
that
any claim by a minor against a health care provider ... whether
in contract or tort, based on an alleged act, omission, or neglect
shall be commenced within three years from the date the cause of
action accrues, except that a minor under the full age of six years
shall have until his ninth birthday in which the action may be
commenced, but in no event shall any such action be commenced
more than seven years after occurrence of the act or omission

192

These statutes have sparked questions of constitutionality193
and have also presented problems for parent-plaintiffs who have
lost a child due to medical malpractice yet did not learn of the neg
ligence until after the seven-year limit, or who have attempted to
rely on the "ninth birthday"194 language to bring a suit that would
otherwise be dismissed because of the repose limitation.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. (Sosa, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006).
BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 1451.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D.
See generally Mantell, supra note 44.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D.
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Baker v. Binder and the Intent of the Massachusetts
Legislature

On January 18, 1982, Angelique Baker's father brought a suit
on her behalf alleging that the doctor's negligence during her birth
ultimately required surgical removal of a portion of her small intes
tine. 195 Later, in May of 1987, he commenced a secoI1d suit relating
to additional negligence on the day of his daughter's birth, includ
ing negligent supervision by the hospital, failure to diagnose his
daughter's condition, and negligent postoperative administration of
a feeding tube. 196 Although the second suit was dismissed for rea
sons unrelated to the minority savings provision, the court took the
opportunity to explain the purpose and history of the statute of
repose. 197
In response to concerns about the cost of medical malpractice
insurance in the early 1970s, Massachusetts, like many other states,
enacted legislation to attempt to limit the number of malpractice
claims.l 98 It did so by placing special restrictions, which are not
otherwise applicable to tort actions, on medical malpractice
claims. 199 Until 1976, the statute of limitations for actions by mi
nors did not begin to run until the minor reached the age of major
ity.2OO However, in 1976 the legislature shortened the period in
which an action by a minor could be brought to three years, with
the exception that a minor under the age of six had until his ninth
birthday to commence a lawsuit. 201
The apparent purpose of the limited time period was to dispirit
claims after an unreasonable amount of time had passed, thus in
creasing the difficulty of defending the claims and causing increased
medical malpractice insurance premiums. 202 The court does not
mention how it would be equally difficult to pursue a claim after a
long passage of time, nor does it address the difficult situation in
which an injury is not discovered until after the statute of limita
tions has run. The problems created by Massachusetts's shortened
195. Baker v. Binder, 609 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 & n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
196. Id. at 1241 & n.5.
197. Id. at 1241-42.
198. Id. at 1242.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 7 (1972) (repealed 1975).
201. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006).
202. Baker, 609 N.E.2d at 1242 (citing Austin v. Boston Univ. Hosp., 262 N.E.2d
515 (Mass. 1977).
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statute of limitation are highlighted in the case of Joslyn v.
Chang. 203

2. Joslyn v. Chang and the Problem of Statutes of Repose
Sen tree Joslyn was diagnosed with a rare metabolic disorder
when she was seven months 01d.204 She could not tolerate nourish
ment and experienced weakness and a general failure to thrive. 20s
In October 1992, she was taken to Children's Hospital Boston,
where doctors discovered that fluid had built up around her en
larged heart.206 A resident, supervised by Dr. Chang, performed
surgery to drain the fluid. 207 During the surgery, however, the resi
dent punctured Sentree's heart and coronary artery.20S Sentree lost
a significant amount of blood, which ultimately contributed to her
death.209
The death certificate signed by the resident stated that the
death was naturally caused, and neither he nor Dr. Chang told the
plaintiffs that their daughter's heart had been punctured during sur
gery.210 Instead, the doctors informed the family that Sentree's
"heart was 'too weak to withstand the procedure."'211 Moreover,
the plaintiffs were never made aware of autopsy results or medical
records, but were told that "records were not sent to patients be
cause the materials would contain incomprehensible medical
terms."212
The Joslyns were unaware of the negligence of the resident
performing the surgery until nine years later, in 2001, when, at the
suggestion of Sentree's pediatrician, the Joslyns obtained all the
medical records and learned of the surgical negligence. 213 Follow
ing their disturbing discovery, the Joslyns filed suit, which was dis
missed as untimely under the Massachusetts statute of repose
relating to medical malpractice claims.214
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005).
ld. at 1108.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 1108-09.
ld. at 1109.
ld.
ld.
ld.
/d.

ld.
/d. at 1108; see also

MASS. GEN. LAWS

ch. 231, § 60D (2006).
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The court pointed to previous case law stating that the statute
of repose is an absolute time limit with the effect of placing a "limit
on the liability of those within its protection and to abolish a plain
tiff's cause of action thereafter, even if the plaintiff's injury does not
occur, or is not discovered, until after the statute's time limit has
expired."215 This limitation was enacted by the legislature in re
sponse to mounting litigation relating to medical malpractice in an
effort to reduce the number of claims that could be filed. It was
developed after a 1986 report by a special commission that "ad
dress[ed] a 'crisis ... in Massachusetts medical professional liability
insurance.' "216 The commission stated that malpractice claims had
increased by fifty percj;!nt in the last six months of 1981. 217 The Jos
lyn court traced this incline back to the 1980 case Franklin v. Albert
that held that the action for malpractice accrued, "when the plain
tiff learn[ed], or reasonably should have learned, that he ha[d] been
harmed by the defendant's conduct."218 This "discovery" rule re
placed the previous rule that the action accrued at the time of the
alleged malpractice.219
Although the court linked the jump in malpractice claims to
the adoption of the discovery rule, the special commission noted
that the reasons for the jump were "still unexplained."220 Further
more, the special commission downplayed the connection, claiming
that it had "no information suggesting that such an increase has oc
curred or will OCCUr."221 Interestingly, the Massachusetts legislature
has proposed legislation that, if passed, would eliminate the age and
time limitation,222 which suggests that there is not a link between
the malpractice actions and the Franklin decision. It also gives way
for future cases like Joslyn to be fairly adjudicated.

215. Joslyn, 837 N.E.2d at 1110 (quoting McGuinness v. Cotter, 591 N.E.2d 659,
662 (Mass. 1992».
216. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 174-5355, Reg. Sess., at 5
(Mass. 1986».
217. Id. at 1111.
218. Id. at 1110 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot
ing Franklin v. Albert, 411 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. 1980».
219. See Pasquale v. Chandler, 215 N.E.2d 319 (Mass. 1966), overruled by Frank
lin, 411 N.E.2d 263.
220. Joslyn, 837 N.E.2d at 1111 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting H.R. Doc.
No. 174-5355, Reg. Sess., at 5).
221. Id. at 1110-11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. Doc. No.
173-5980, Reg. Sess., at 17 (Mass. 1983»; see also infra IV.B.3.
222. H.R. 1341, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007).
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FLAWED RATIONALE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

While courts have justified dismissing otherwise valid claims
brought by parents wishing to invoke the minority tolling provisions
on several grounds, the outcomes have all been the same. Whether
based on plain language, statutory interpretation, or legislative in
tent and history, the holdings of the courts have denied recovery to
parents seeking compensation from those who have contributed to
the death of their children. These parents deserve the chance to
litigate their claims beyond the typical two year statute of limitation
and there is justification for allowing them to do so. These are
questions of statutory interpretation and public policy, and, while
there is not one answer that can accommodate each of the states'
issues, there is at least another side to the story.
A.

How the Birthday Rationale Is Flawed
1.

The Plain Meaning Approach

When required to determine the correct interpretation of a
statute, a court first looks to the plain meaning of the words for
guidance. 223 Under this technique, "it is assumed that the legisla
ture probably used the words ... in a 'normal' way to communicate
its intent ...."224 The term "birthday" has more than one meaning,
as recognized by the court in Vance. 225 Under the Random House
definition it can mean, "the anniversary of a birth .... [or] the day
of a person's birth."226 The Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, too,
gives both the anniversary of a birth, and the day of a person's birth
as possible definitions.227 The Vance court chose not to determine
the appropriate definition of "birthday," and instead found that the
term "reach" was determinative. 228 Finding that a deceased child
could not effectively "reach" ten years of age, the court determined
that the legislature had not intended the tolling provision to apply
to claims brought on behalf of deceased children. 229
While the court was proper in looking to the word "reach" for
guidance, it failed to determine the plain meaning of "birthday."
223. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTER
PRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 38 (2002).
224.
225.

2006).
226.
227.
228.
229.

[d.

See Vance v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 726 N.W.2d. 78, 82 (Mich. Ct. App.
.
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICDONARY 134 (2d ed. 1997).
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S, supra note 11, at 126.
Vance, 726 N.W.2d. at 82.
[d. at 82-83.
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The generally accepted canons of statutory construction assume
that each word has meaning; therefore, an interpretation that would
make some words meaningless should be rejected. 230 The Vance
interpretation arguably renders the word "birthday" meaningless.
The statute states that if at the time of the alleged malpractice a
"person has not reached his or her eighth birthday, a .person shall
not bring an action based on the claim unless the action is com
menced on or before the person's tenth birthday."231 The court re
jected a construction that would interpret birthday to mean the
anniversary of birth. The only other "plain meaning" alternative is
an interpretation of "birthday" as the day on which a person is
born. Assuming the court had adopted this definition, the statute
would seem to mean that a person is only entitled to the exception
if she has not yet reached "the day of a person's birth." Not only
does this interpretation render the term "birthday" useless in the
statute, but it would seem to apply only to fetuses or actions by
mothers for babies in utero.
The more logical interpretation is to interpret "birthday" to
mean the anniversary of one's birth. This is the meaning most often
used in everyday conversation and is consistent with the canons of
interpretation. To decipher legislative intent the court is to "as
sume[] that the legislature probably used the words ... in a 'nor
mal' way" and give the words "the meaning that they would
ordinarily produce."232 For example, one might say, "Today is Lin
coln's birthday." Although Abraham Lincoln died on April 15,
1865, we celebrate the anniversary of the day of his birth on Febru
ary 12th of each year. 233 Using this common definition, the Michi
gan statute would be interpreted to mean that if a minor has not
reached the eighth anniversary of his birth, he is entitled to the
exception.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania court in Holt found persuasive a
Wisconsin case that held that in order to "reach" a particular age, a
minor must be living.234 However, the Holt court did not ade
quately interpret its own statute before importing Wisconsin case
230. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 84.
231. MICH. COMPo LAWS. ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000); see also Vance, 726
N.W.2d. at 82.
232. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 224, at 38.
233. President Abraham Lincoln was born on February 12, 1809. The White
House, Biography of Abraham Lincoln, http://www.whitehouse.govlhistory/presidents/
a116.html (last visited April 15, 2009).
234. Holt V. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citing Awve V.
Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 512 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994».
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law. The relevant Pennsylvania statute in Holt stated that a minor
entitled to bring a claim who has not yet attained the age of eigh
teen "shall have the same time for commencing an action after at
taining majority."235 Under a plain-meaning interpretation, this
clause alone does not permit the parents of a deceased child to file
a suit invoking the child's minority savings provision. Looking
solely at this sentence, it is clear that a deceased child could never
reach the age of eighteen; thus, parents are barred from invoking
the statute if their child dies.
However, the last clause of the statute, which the Holt court
fails to emphasize, states that for the purposes of the infancy provi
sion, a minor is defined as, "any individual who has not yet attained
eighteen years of age."236 Importing this statutory definition of a
minor into the tolling provision, it would seem that any person, liv
ing or dead, who has not yet attained the age of eighteen is a minor
and can, as a result, rely on the statute. 237
2.

Will a Deceased Child Ever Have a Fourteenth
Birthday?

In Campos, the court dismissed the idea that the Texas legisla
ture could have intended the minority savings provision to apply to
deceased minors because it reasoned that a dead child ceases to
age. 238 The court summarized the plaintiff's position, stating that
"[u]nder this argument ... the statute of limitations would never
run in a situation where a child dies and therefore never reaches the
age fourteen."239 Yet, after death, a child ceases aging but does not
cease having birthdays. Under the plain meaning, a birthday is an
anniversary of one's birth; thus, a dead child will continue to have
birthdays, as does any living child. 240 Therefore, the fourteenth an
niversary of the dead child's birth would mark the running of the
235.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 5533(b)(1)(i) (West 2004)).

236. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
237. For an alternative interpretation of the decision in Holt, see Christina Gil
lotti, Note, Superior Court Interprets Minority Tolling Statute: Statute Does Not Apply to
Estate of Minors Who Do Not Survive Injury, ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N. L.J., Mar.
2002, at 2; William M. Green, From the ACBA: Death of Minor Plaintiff Kills Hope of
Tolling Statute of Limitations, ALLEGHENY COUNTY B. ASS'N. L.J., Oct. 2002, at 4.
238. Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc. (Campos II), 879 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.
1994).
239. Id. at 73.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 226-227.
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statute of limitations and satisfy the Campos court's concern of the
endless statute of limitations.
Additionally, even when a court concludes that the plain
meaning interpretation requires that a child must be leaving to
reach a birthday, there exists a "golden rule" that could save a par
ent's claim. The golden-rule exception to the plain-meaning inter
pretation states that where the plain meaning produces a result that
is ridiculous or unjust, the judge may determine that the legislature
could not have intended such a result and reject the interpreta
tion.241 Early on, this meant that a judge could simply set aside a
statute when its plain meaning produced an injustice.242 However,
today the rule is more limited: when the rule applies, the plain
meaning is not determinative. 243 Instead, the court must turn to
legislative intent, the purpose for which the statute was passed, and
the context in which it was passed. 244

B. Judicial Determinations of Legislative Intent Have Focused on
the Wrong Issue
Whereas the courts discussed have cited to their own states'
perceived medical malpractice litigation crises as the reason for the
enactment of statutes shortening the limitations period, there is a
more focused point of each statute that relates directly to minors.
The pressing issue, which the courts have not directly addressed, is
why the exception for minors exists in this type of statute. If the
reasons for the exception to the rule exist regardless of whether the
child survived, then there is good reason to allow the exception to
hold even if the child has died.
1.

Reasons for Limiting Medical Malpractice Actions

In response to an insurance crisis during the 1970s that had
caused physicians to limit their practices, retire early, and refuse
patients, Texas passed the Medical Liability Insurance Improve
ment Act (MLIIA).245 In determining cases such as Brown, the
241. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 40-41; see also Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1,31 (1948) (explaining that "the 'plain meaning' rule [must] give way
where its application would produce a futile result, or an unreasonable result").
242. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 223, at 41.
243. [d.
244. [d. at 42-48; see also McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861
(2005) ("Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes up
the daily fare of every appellate court in the country.").
245. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01 (1977) (repealed 2003); see
also Hamrick, supra note 31, at 132.
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courts have listed these reasons for enacting th~ statute and have
remarked on the intent of the legislature to limit physician liability
and thus decrease insurance premiums by limiting the time period
in which a medical malpractice action could be filed. 246 In enacting
the MLIIA, the expressed goals of the Texas legislature included:
"(1) reducing frequency and severity of health care liability claims;
(2) decreasing the costs of malpractice insurance; (3) protecting
health care providers from liability through affordable insurance;
and (4) ensuring the public access to affordable health care."247
The Brown court apparently inferred from these goals that the leg
islature did not intend that parents of deceased minors be able to
invoke the minority tolling provision, rationalizing that this would
only result in more cases. 248
Similarly, Massachusetts courts have followed the same line of
interpretation in determining legislative intent. In 1986, the Massa
chusetts legislature amended its own medical malpractice statute to
include a seven-year statute of repose for minors. 249 The statute
was a response to insurers threatening to withdraw from the mal
practice market and refusing to insure physicians. Even though the
bill's sponsors stated that the insurers were reacting to a national
trend of high settlements for medical malpractice claims, they main
tained that the further limitations on a minor's ability to bring
claims would effectively ensure the availability of physicians' insur
ance. 250 The statutes of repose and further limitation of minors'
rights were enacted to curb malpractice litigation and ensure af
fordable health care and insurance. 251 The Massachusetts courts
have held that allowing a claim like that in Joslyn to go forward
would defeat the statute's purpose. 252
The state of Indiana allows the parent of a deceased child to
bring a wrongful death claim and "recover for the loss of that
child's services, love, care and affection, as well as health care, hos
pitalization, funeral and burial expenses," among other things.253
Under this statute a parent may file suit and be awarded damages,
246. See Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331, 333-34 (Tex. 1998); see also Hamrick,
supra note 31, at 132.
247. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 137.
248. See generally Brown, 968 S.W. 2d 331.
249. Mantell, supra note 44, at 100.
250. ld. at 99.
251. See Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107, 110-11 (Mass. 2005).
252. See id.
253. Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003).
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at "any time between the death of the child and the date the child
would have reached twenty years of age."254 The Court in Ran
dolph, however, made the distinction that the wrongful death stat
ute does not apply in an action where the wrongful death resulted
from medical malpractice, instead applying the medical malpractice
statute and shortening the limitations period. 255
This inequity is based solely on the manner in which the child
died. The parent of a child who died, not as a result of medical
malpractice, but from some other negligence could wait until the
child would have reached twenty. Yet, the parent of a child who
died from a physician's negligence may be denied the same benefit.
Furthermore, the tolling provision in and of itself should be
determinative of the intent of each state's respective legislature.
While this history of the insurance atmosphere in the 1970s may be
helpful in determining why medical malpractice limitation statutes
were enacted initially, it misses the mark regarding claims for the
wrongful death of children. There are specific provisions within
each of the statutes that refer to a minor's right to toll the otherwise
applicable limitations period. The rationale behind including a mi
nority tolling provision, instead of the reasons for limiting malprac
tice litigation, should be the focus of interpretation.
2.

The Intent of the Savings Provisions

Children need more legal protection than other classes. 256
From drinking ages to driver's licenses, states have widely recog
nized this concept in various aspects of the law. With regard to
personal injury, Texas has traditionally been protective of its mi
nors: "[T]he numerous Texas statutes allowing minors to toll the
commencement of limitations until they attain majority evidence a
legislative view that minors are incapable of filing claims while
under a disability."257
However, there are reasons beyond a minor's incapacity to file
for tolling the statute of limitations. As pointed out by the dissent
in Regents of University of New Mexico v. Armijo, forcing parents
to file suit within a two-year limitation period would force claims to
be filed without full knowledge of the scope of the harm visited on
254. [d.; see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-2-1 (2008).
255. Randolph, 793 N.E.2d at 237.
256. Holt v. Lenko, 791 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (quoting Robinson
v. Pa. Hosp., 737 A.2d 291 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999».
257. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 175.
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their child. 258 Under this rationale it is possible that more, not
fewer, frivolous lawsuits would be filed, based on a jump-the-gun
mentality. Parents could feel pressured to file any claim, for fear
that waiting to discover all facts related to their child's death would
result in a total bar on recovery.
Additionally, minors are also given a longer opportunity to file
suit so that they have time to discover their injuries. 259 As seen
above, several of the deceased children were babies at the time of
death. Had they lived to the age of three, four, or five, it is plausi
ble that injuries not otherwise obvious would have presented them
selves. The tolling provision, therefore, gives the child an
opportunity to grow and develop, while also providing enough time
so that the child may speak on her own behalf and possibly testify
at a trial.260
Some courts have given the rationale that death removes a mi
nor's disability and, thus, there is no reason for the parents to have
the opportunity to invoke the tolling provision. 261 Yet, upon the
death of a child, the challenges that a child would face bringing a
suit under the age of legal majority still exist. Arguably the chal
lenge for a plaintiff bringing suit on behalf of a deceased child is
tougher because when a child dies, the best evidence of malpractice
dies too. There is no one with visible injuries to take the stand and
testify on his own behalf, nor is there an opportunity to see the
entirety of the harm develop. Arguably, the same problem exists
with a deceased adult. However, with an adult there is a presump
tion that she would have the cognitive ability to tell her family of
the harm she suffered; this is not so with a young child. If parents
are forced to rely on administrator statutes and file suit within two
years of the death, the lack of their best evidence-the child
means the investigation must begin soon after the funeral.
Defendants argue that while this may be a harsh result for
plaintiff parents, it benefits the medical community and "serve[s] to
provide some relief to physicians" by "effectively limit[ing] the un
certainty regarding potential claims to a much shorter period. "262
258. Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Armijo, 704 P.2d 428, 430 (N.M. 1985) (Sosa, J.,
dissenting).
259. Id. (citing Slade v. Slade, 468 P.2d 627 (N.M. 1970».
260. See id.
261. See Bailey v. Martz, 488 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that
"[the child's] death removed his legal age disability"), superseded by statute, IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-23·2·1 (2008), as recognized in Ellenwine v. Fairley, 846 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind.
2006).
262. Greene, supra note 237, at 4.
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Fairness to defendants, fresh evidence, and avoiding stale claims are
important concerns. However, when applied to parents of the de
ceased children, this rationale is inconsistent with the very statutes
at issue. Living children injured by medical negligence can wait un
til they are nine years old in Massachusetts,263 ten in Michigan,264
fourteen in Texas,265 eighteen in Indiana,266 and twenty in Penn
sylvania to file a claim.267 If the evidence is still fresh for a living
child after eighteen years, how can it be said that the evidence is
stale for a deceased child?
In each of these scenarios, whether the child be living or de
ceased, after many years it is possible that the evidence and avail
ability of witnesses will cease to be completely accurate, fresh, or
otherwise useful. However, if the opportunity is available for a liv
ing minor, it should also be available to those bringing a suit on
behalf of a deceased minor.
3.

Statutes of Repose Slowly Disappear

From Massachusetts to Texas, legislatures and courts have be
gun to abolish absolute limitations on malpractice actions. 268 Ini
tially enacted to limit the number of medical malpractice claims
that could be brought, statutes of repose are beginning to be re
pealed and struck down as unconstitutional.269 On grounds of due
process and equal protection, "minors filing medical wrongful death
claims are the only class of plaintiffs whose rights are prematurely
termina ted. "270
Recently, the Massachusetts legislature has proposed amend
ing its statute to eliminate the entirety of the minority provision and
the statute of repose caveat, and replacing the section with the
words "is discovered."271 The proposed amendment recognizes
that an absolute bar on recovery may be unconstitutional and is
263. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60D (2006).
264. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.5851(7) (West 2000).
265. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008),
invalidated by Adams v. Gottwald, 179 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App. 2005).
266. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-7-1(b) (2008).
267. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.513 (West Supp. 2008).
268. See H.R. 1341, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2007); Hamrick, supra
note 31, at 127-28; see also Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1995); Sax v. Vot
teler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
269. Mantell, supra note 44, at 104-05; see also Strahler v. St. Luke's Hasp., 706
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1986); Schwan v. Riverside Methodist Hasp., 452 N.E.2d 1337 (Ohio
1983); Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 66l.
270. Hamrick, supra note 31, at 128.
271. Mass. H.R. 1341.
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certainly contrary to public policy. The discovery rule provides a
fairer time period in which the plaintiff can file suit, and promotes
honesty within the doctor-patient relationship.272 Whereas previ
ously claims that were over seven-years-old were ultimately dis
missed as untimely in Massachusetts,273 this proposal allows parents
to discover the injury and or malpractice and file suit accordingly.
The rule as it stands today encourages deceit by the physician who,
because of a medical error, believes a suit may be filed against him.
If the physician can deceive the patient and escape being sued im
mediately, he is effectively off-the-hook after seven years have
passed.
Though statutes of repose do not directly address the problem
that a parent faces when attempting to invoke a minority tolling
provision in a wrongful death suit, it is a helpful analogy. Legisla
tures and courts are moving toward a more liberal approach to
medical malpractice statutes by removing absolute bars on recov
ery. If it is unconstitutional and unfair to bar a minor's recovery
after seven years it can be analogized that barring a parent's claim
on behalf of his child is also inequitable.
C.

The Appropriate Interpretation of the Statutes

Parents who lose a child as a result of medical malpractice
should be able to file a wrongful death action and invoke their de
ceased child's right to toll the statute of limitation until the age of
majority. If the plain-language interpretation supporting this posi
tion 274 is not convincing on its own, public policy, rules of civil pro
cedure, and the status of the current medical malpractice cnSlS
provide ample support for adopting this interpretation.

272. The Connecticut case of Altieri v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. provides a good ex
ample. See Altieri v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. X06CV020171626S, 2002 WL 31898323
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2002). Donna Marie Altieri was given a fatal dose of her prescription
due to an error by a CVS pharmacist. Id. at *1. The Altieri family was told that she
died of a heart attack and only after asking for an autopsy did they find her death to be
the result of a morphine overdose. The Altieris became aware of the pharmacist's error
after hiring a lawyer to investigate a potential malpractice lawsuit. If the family had
delayed hiring an attorney and a statute of repose had been in effect, the pharmacy
would have escaped liability. See BAKER, supra note 10, at 102-03.
273. See, e.g., Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005).
274. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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Public Policy and Rules of Civil Procedure Are
Furthered by a More Liberal Interpretation

Allowing parents to invoke minority tolling provisions rights
furthers the two goals of the tort system: compensation and deter
rence. 275 The rules of the tort system deter negligent behavior by
imposing the costs of the injuries on the person who could have
avoided the accident or injury.276 Furthermore, the tort system pro
vides victims of negligent behavior compensation for their inju
ries. 277 By allowing a victim's parents to invoke minority tolling
provision rights, the negligent behavior of doctors will be deterred
and the victim's family will be compensated for the loss. On the
other hand, preventing parents from using the minority tolling pro
visions not only suppresses the goals of the tort system, but also
compromises the rules of civil procedure and the very reasons why
our country developed statutes of limitation.
The federal rules of civil procedure were developed to resolve
disputes through adjudication.27 8 Successful adjudication includes a
determination of the appropriate legal standard, the facts of the dis~
pute, and the proper application of the law to the facts to determine
the remedy.279 With these goals in mind, state and federal govern
ments drafted rules of civil procedure. The principal goal of civil
procedure is that "cases should not turn on procedural technicali
ties, but instead should be decided with an emphasis on
accuracy. "280

Applying these principles, the legal standard that society seeks
to enforce through medical malpractice statutes is the deterrence of
negligent medical care. Therefore, a doctor who negligently punc
tured a child's heart during surgery and caused the death of that
child has violated the legal standard. 281 Consequently, compensa
tory damages should be awarded to the victims of the negligence.
However, in the case of parents filing wrongful death malpractice
suits, such compensation has been denied due to a technicality-the
parents' belief that their claim was timely under the minority tolling
275.
POLICY 3
276.
277.
278.
(2007).
279.
280.
281.

ROBERT E. LITAN & CLIFFORD WINSTON, LIABILITY: PERSPEcrIVES AND
(1988).
Jd.
Jd.
See SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, ESSENTIALS: CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
Jd. at 11-12.
Jd. at 3l.
See Joslyn v. Chang, 837 N.E.2d 1107 (Mass. 2005).
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provision. Even if courts are unpersuaded that the plain language
refers to both living and deceased minors' rights to bring suit, the
fact that an otherwise valid claim is dismissed summarily is against
public policy and the goals of the civil procedure system. These
claims should be allowed to proceed on their merits, therefore
reaching the accuracy of the cases. The legislatures have been
clear. They intended to enact statutes that allow children who have
been victims of medical malpractice to bring valid claims against
their tortfeasors. The purpose of the statutes is to allow a child
without the faculties or knowledge to have an extended time period
in order to develop skills to articulate his injury. To deny parents
who have lost a child the same rights that their child would have
had, is particularly unjust-especially because the parents have the
difficult task of deciphering the harm their child suffered without
the help of that child.
2.

Medical Malpractice Statutes Are Not Compromised by
This Interpretation

Allowing parents of deceased children additional time to bring
suit is not inconsistent with the goal of reducing frivolous law
suits.282 The limitations were created in response to a medical mal
practice crisis to limit the number of suits that could be brought and
thereby reduce the cost of physician malpractice insurance premi
ums. 283 Dismissing claims brought by parents who have relied on
the minority tolling provision does not have the effect of reducing
frivolous lawsuits. It reduces neither insurance premiums nor the
cost of health care because the cases are dismissed before any frivo
lousness could have been known. The claims are never determined
to be frivolous because they are never judged on their merits.
These claims have been summarily dismissed, solely because
parents relied on their child's right to toll the statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits could have had excellent evidence
that the standard of care was breached, expert witnesses to testify
as to the causation, and an otherwise "home run" case. In tort par
lance, but for the technicality of the tolling provision, they could
have proceeded. Even if these claims were allowed to proceed on
their facts, there is no conclusive evidence that medical malpractice
premiums would skyrocket as a result. The meritorious claims
282.
283.
2003).

See generally LITAN & WINSTON, supra note 275, at 101-27.
See Randolph v. Methodist Hosps., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 231, 236 (Ind. Ct. App.
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would proceed to settlement or a jury trial-as it should-and the
frivolous claims, or claims where there was no proof of causation,
would be weeded out through the discovery process. Because the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and in most cases it has been
several years since the alleged malpractice, there is a great
probability that few of the parents invoking the minority tolling
provision would have successful cases. Thus, the population of
plaintiffs having any effect on the insurance industry would be min
iscule and the malpractice statutes would still retain their teeth.
3.

Changing Perceptions: Are Physicians and Insurance
Companies Really the Ones to Blame?

The medical malpractice "crisis" to which so many state legisla
tures responded may have ties to causes other than "frivolous litiga
tion and runaway juries."284 "[A]s many as 98,000 people die each
year in American hospitals due to medical errors, more than auto
accidents, breast cancer, and HIV/AIDS combined."285 Perhaps
the litigation is in response to the sub-par level of care being admin
istered. Additionally, opponents of those who would call the medi
cal insurance premium hike a "crisis" counter this proposition by
saying that it is "an insurance crisis, not a tort crisis."286 Donald
Zuk, chief executive of SCPIE Holdings, a medical malpractice in
surer, was quoted as stating, "I don't like to hear insurance-com
pany executives say it's the tort system-it'S self inflicted."287 The
problem is this:
Liability insurance goes through a boom-and-bust cycle .... To
ward the end of the cycle, they take an increasingly optimistic
view of future losses and do not set aside enough reserves. As a
result, they begin charging prices that are too low in relation to
the risk. Because medical malpractice claims take so long to re
solve ... the shortfalls in the reserves to pay medical malpractice
claims accumulate over a number of years. When the insurance
climate shifts back to a pessimistic view of future losses, insur
ance companies need to increase their reserves, sometimes quite
dramatically ... and prices rise accordingly.288
284. BAKER, supra note 10, at 2.
285. Remaking American Medicine, Episode #1: The Silent Killer, http://www.
remakingamericanmedicine.orglepisodel.htmi (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
286. BAKER, supra note 10, at 45.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 66.
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If the problem of unaffordable medical malpractice insurance

has forced doctors to leave the profession, perhaps they have only
themselves and their insurers to blame. Regardless of the reasons
for the increased rates, plaintiffs who bring valid claims to court
deserve to have their cases litigated. They should not be summarily
turned away on a technicality designed to protect the insurance
companies and negligent medical staff.
CONCLUSION

Minority tolling provisions enable minors to realize the full
scope of the harm inflicted on them before filing suit. When a child
dies, this harm is even more difficult to articulate because the best
evidence of what the harm was that led to the death has also died.
Allowing a parent to have the same amount of time that the child
himself would have had to file suit allows for the parent to fully
understand and investigate the potential medical malpractice claim
and avoids the quick-fire filing of a frivolous claim. Allowing reli
ance by the parent, or administrator, only provides the benefit that
the child would have had and no more. The argument that this ad
ditional time allows for the spoliation of evidence or causes unavail
ability of witnesses falls short because it is the same time period
allowed by statute for a minor. This is especially true in states
where the statute is tolled for up to eighteen years.289
Furthermore, allowing reliance on the minority tolling provi
sion after the child has died is consistent with both the legislative
intent and the plain language of these statutes. This interpretation
promotes compensation and deterrence, the goals of the tort sys
tem, as well as resolving disputes on the merits of each case, the
goal of civil procedure. Additionally, public policy is furthered by a
liberal interpretation and application of the minority tolling provi
sions. Plaintiffs have an opportunity to be heard and can be com
pensated for their losses while physicians are deterred from
wrongdoing. Most importantly, a child's death due to an adult's
negligence does not go unpunished or overlooked.
Gretchen R. Fuhr

289. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5533(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (West 2004) (statute is
tolled until minor reaches eighteen years of age).

